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Abstract: Cloud computing is a powerful and popular information technology 
paradigm that enables data service outsourcing and provides higher-level services 
with minimal management effort. However, it is still a key challenge to protect data 
privacy when a user accesses the sensitive cloud data. Privacy-preserving database 
query allows the user to retrieve a data item from the cloud database without 
revealing the information of the queried data item, meanwhile limiting user’s ability 
to access other ones. In this study, in order to achieve the privacy preservation and 
reduce the communication complexity, a quantum-based database query scheme for 
privacy preservation in cloud environment is developed. Specifically, all the data 
items of the database are firstly encrypted by different keys for protecting server’s 
privacy, and in order to guarantee the clients’ privacy, the server is required to 
transmit all these encrypted data items to the client with the oblivious transfer 
strategy. Besides, two oracle operations, a modified Grover iteration, and a special 
offset encryption mechanism are combined together to ensure that the client can 
correctly query the desirable data item. Finally, performance evaluation is conducted 
to validate the correctness, privacy, and efficiency of our proposed scheme.  
Keywords: Cloud database, quantum-based database query, privacy preservation, 
oblivious transfer, oracle operation, Grover iteration, offset encryption 
 
1. Introduction 
Cloud computing is a powerful computing paradigm that 
enables ubiquitous access to shared infrastructure 
resources and higher-level services. It has shown the 
remarkable advantage in load balancing, data access 
control, and resources sharing, for database management 
[1]. Benefiting from the cloud paradigm, an increasing 
number of individuals and groups choose to put their 
massive data (including private part) into the cloud.  
In recent years, database outsourcing has become an 
important component of cloud computing [2], where data 
owners outsource data management to a service provider 
(i.e., cloud database), and this mode is also called 
Database-as-a-Service (DaaS) [3]. Cloud database 
provides users with capabilities to store and process their 
data in the cloud, which has the advantages of scalability 
and high availability that users can access data anytime, 
anywhere and anyway. However, all the data of data 
owner is stored in the cloud environment, and some 
sensitive data (e.g., health records, financial transactions, 
personal information) is at risk of being compromised. 
So, security and privacy have become the major 
challenges which inhibit the cloud computing wide 
acceptance in practice [4]. 
The privacy preservation is the main concern of cloud 
application, such as service recommendation [5-7], 
service quality prediction [8, 9], database query [10-16] 
etc. As an important research branch, the 
privacy-preserving database query (PPDQ) aims to 
protect database security and clients’ privacy, while 
ensuring the correctness of database query. To be specific, 
any user can query data items from the cloud database 
without revealing its information, but his/her access to 
other data items is not permitted. There are a variety of 
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techniques or methods for guaranteeing the privacy 
preservation of database query, such as homomorphic 
encryption (HE) [10, 11], attribute-based encryption 
(ABE) [12, 13, 14], and searchable encryption (SE) [15, 
16], etc. Searchable encryption is a cryptographic system 
which offers secure search functions over encrypted data, 
which is considered to be a more effective technique to 
solve the problem of PPDQ. In 2000, Song et al. [15] 
proposed the first searchable encryption scheme based on 
symmetric key cryptography (SKC). Since then, other 
various SE schemes have been continuously proposed, 
such as public key cryptography (PKC)-based searchable 
encryption [17], secure ranked search over encrypted 
cloud data [18], and so on.  
As we all know, the security of classic cryptography 
protocols, including most private query schemes (also 
named privacy-preserving database query schemes), are 
based on mathematical complexity, and its security is 
based on the fact that computing power is limited. 
However, with the prevalence of new distributed 
computing models (especially cloud computing), a 
normal user is given the super computing power far 
beyond a single computer. Therefore, these cryptography 
protocols based on computational complexity are facing 
serious challenges. 
On the other hand, quantum computing demonstrates 
the superior parallel computing power that the classical 
paradigm can't match. For instance, Shor’s algorithm [19] 
solves the problem of integer factorization in polynomial 
time, and Grover’s algorithm [20] has a quadratic 
speedup to the problem of conducting a search through 
some unstructured database. Therefore, most classic 
cryptography protocols, including PPDQ schemes, are 
very vulnerable to the powerful quantum computer. 
Fortunately, quantum mechanics also provides a security 
mechanism against quantum attacks, and it holds the 
potential unconditional security based on some physical 
properties, such as non-cloning theorem, uncertainty 
principle, quantum entanglement, etc. With the 
application of quantum mechanics in the field of 
information processing, some research findings have 
been proposed, including quantum key distribution [21, 
22], quantum secret sharing [23, 24], quantum key 
agreement [25, 26], quantum direct communication [27, 
28], quantum stegonagraphy [29], quantum teleportation 
and remote state preparation [30-32], quantum sealed-bid 
auction [33, 34], delegating quantum computation [35], 
and quantum machine learning [36, 37].  
With the above observations, the security of classic 
database query schemes is facing the dual challenge of 
cloud computing and quantum computing, while 
quantum mechanics has been proven to be an effective 
method for solving such problem. In this study, in order 
to implement the privacy-preserving database query in 
cloud environment, we utilize some physical properties 
of quantum mechanics to design a quantum-based 
database query scheme for privacy preservation (QBDQ) 
in cloud environment, and conduct its performance 
evaluation to show our scheme is feasible, secure and 
efficient. To be specific, our main contributions include 
the three following aspects.  
1) We present a systematic framework for privacy 
preservation cloud database query scheme in the 
cloud environment.  
2) A feasible QBDQ is designed through oblivious 
transfer, the offset encryption mechanism, oracle 
operation, and the modified Grover iteration to 
achieve the privacy preservation for the cloud 
database query and reduce its communication 
complexity.  
3) The performance evaluation is conducted to 
verify the performance of our proposed QBDQ 
scheme, such as correctness, security, and 
efficiency.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we introduce the basic knowledge of quantum 
computing, while the framework of the 
privacy-preserving database query in cloud environment 
is presented. In Section 3, the problem of 
privacy-preserving database query in cloud environment 
is defined, and then the proposed QBDQ is elaborated 
step by step. Section 4 conduct the performance 
evaluation from the aspects of correctness, security, and 
efficiency. After that, Section 5 summarizes the related 
work on cloud database queries, SE, and quantum private 
queries. Finally, the conclusion of the paper and the 
prospection for future work are presented in Section 6. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section, the basic knowledge of quantum 
computing is introduced firstly. Then, we introduced the 
principle of oblivious transfer (OT). And finally, a cloud 
computing framework for privacy preservation is 
designed.  
2.1 Quantum computing  
(1) Quantum bit 
The classic bit is the smallest unit in the classic computer, 
and its value is either 0 or 1. Unlike classical computers, 
the smallest unit of quantum computers is qubit 
(quantum bit), which is the quantum analog of the classic 
bit. A qubit is a unit vector in a two-dimensional complex 
Hilbert space, and its Dirac notation is represented as 
follows: 
0 1    ,               (1) 
where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the probability amplitudes of the 
state |𝜑⟩, and |𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2 = 1. Since the vectors |0⟩ 
and |1⟩  are basis states and can be represented as 
follows, 
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1 0
0 1
0 1
   
    
   
,           (2) 
the qubit |𝜑⟩  can be expressed in vector form 
|𝜑⟩ = (
𝛼
𝛽). In addition, the single qubit can be extended 
to multiple qubits, for example, an n-qubit system can 
exist in any superposed basis states 
0 1 2 1
0 1 2 1n
n   

    .     (3) 
Here, ∑ |𝛼𝑖|
22𝑛−1
𝑖=0 = 1 . Quantum states { |0⟩ , |1⟩ ,…, 
|2𝑛 − 1⟩} form a complete orthonormal basis in Hilbert 
space. 
(2) Unitary operator 
In a closed quantum system, the evolution of the 
system is characterized by a series of unitary operators, 
that is, 
U   ,                (4) 
where 𝑈𝑈† = 𝑈†𝑈 = 𝐼 , and 𝑈†  is the transpose 
conjugate of 𝑈. Each unitary operator corresponds to a 
quantum gate. Similar to a logic gate in classical 
calculations, the quantum gate can be represented in 
matrix form, and the quantum gate over a qubit is 
represented by a 2 × 2  unitary matrix. For instance, 
Pauli-X, Pauli-Z, and the Hadamard gate H are important 
quantum operators over one qubit described in Eq. (5) 
0 1 1 0 1 11
1 0 0 1 1 12
X Z H
     
       
      
. (5) 
(3) Quantum measurement 
The quantum state is in a superposition state, and it 
must be measured to collapse to a basis state to obtain a 
result. Assuming that the quantum state is |𝜑⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ 𝛼𝑖|𝑖⟩
𝑁−1
𝑖=0  before measurement operator, quantum 
measurements are described by a collection {𝑀𝑖}  of 
measurement operators which satisfy the completeness 
equation 
1
†
0
N
i i
i
M M I


 ,               (6) 
where 𝑖  indicates the possible outcome of the 
measurement. The quantum state is measured by the 
measurement basis |𝑖⟩, then the probability that result 𝑖 
occurs is given by 
  †i ip i M M  ,           (7) 
and the post-measurement state is  
†
i
i i
M
M M

 
.               (8) 
2.2 Oblivious transfer 
In cryptography, an oblivious transfer (OT) strategy is a 
type of strategy in which a sender transfers one of 
potentially many pieces of information to a receiver, but 
remains oblivious as to what piece (if any) has been 
transferred. The first form of oblivious transfer was 
introduced by Rabin [38]. In this form, the sender sends 
a message to the receiver with probability 1/2, while the 
sender remains oblivious as to whether or not the 
receiver received the message. OT is a basic strategy in 
the field of cryptography and has a wide range of 
applications. In general, the OT strategy involves two 
parties, the sender and the receiver, and satisfies the 
following characteristics: 
 Whether the queried data can be obtained is entirely 
dependent on probability, rather than sender or 
receiver. That is, neither the sender nor receiver can 
affect the execution of the strategy. 
 After the execution of the strategy, the sender could 
not know whether the receiver got the data he 
wanted to query. 
k-out-of-n (OT𝑛
𝑘) (k<n) is the general form of all OT 
strategies. That is, the sender has n secrets, and the 
receiver can only get k  secrets. The OT𝑛
𝑘  strategy 
consists of two parties, the sender with n secret data 
(𝑑0, 𝑑1, … , 𝑑𝑛−1) , and the receiver with k indices 
(i1, i2, … , i𝑘) . The strategy meets the following 
requirements: 
 Correctness: After executing the strategy, the 
receiver can obtain all of the 𝑑i correctly. 
 Receiver’s security: When the receiver queries the 
data from the sender, the database cannot know the 
receiver’s query items. 
 Sender's security: The receiver cannot get more 
data items from the sender except queried data 
items 
2.3 The framework of privacy-preserving 
database query in cloud environment 
We first consider the framework model of 
privacy-preserving cloud database query system, which 
consists of two main entities (clients and cloud server) as 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Client A
Cloud server
Query
result
Query
request
Client n
Query
request
Query
result
 
 Fig. 1. The framework of privacy-preserving database query in cloud 
environment.  
As shown in Fig. 1, there are n clients and a cloud 
database server, and every client sends a query request to 
the cloud server and gets the query result from the cloud 
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server finally. In this framework, we suppose all the 
clients and server are semi-honest: they are curious about 
cheating the privacy of other’s, but honest to carry out 
the operations in the scheme. Here, two kinds of entity 
can be defined as below, 
Client is the entity that wants to query items from the 
database in the cloud server and can be the connected 
users or the individual user with mobile constrained 
devices such as smartphones, PDA, TPM chip, etc. 
Cloud server is the entity which provides data 
services and computational resources to the clients 
dynamically. 
In this paper, we take three parties as an example, i.e., 
the client Alice, client Bob, and the cloud server Charlie, 
to demonstrate the process of the privacy-preserving 
database query using quantum mechanics. 
3. A quantum-based database query scheme for 
privacy preservation in cloud environment  
In this section, we first define the privacy-preserving 
database query problem and quantum-based 
privacy-preserving database query problem in cloud 
environment. To address this issue, a QBDQ scheme is 
proposed in detail. Before we introduce the relevant 
content, the key notations and descriptions used in this 
section are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Key notations and descriptions involved in proposed 
QBDQ scheme 
Notation Description 
N The number of items in cloud server's database 
D The cloud server's database, D={D0, D1, …, DN-1} 
Di The i-th data in D 
n The number of index qubits used to encode index of 
data items 𝑛 = ⌈log𝑁⌉  
m The number of qubits used to encode data Di 
p The index of client Alice’s query data  
Dp The data item Alice wants to query from D 
q The index of client Bob’s query data  
Dq The data item Bob wants to query from D 
∆s𝐴 The offset value of Alice 
∆s𝐵 The offset value of Bob 
𝐾 The encryption key sequence belongs to Charlie,  
𝐾 = {𝐾0, 𝐾1, … , 𝐾𝑁−1}.  
OK The oracle operation to encode Charlie’s key sequence 
K 
𝑂𝐷
𝐴 The oracle operation to encode Alice’s query result Dp  
𝑂𝐷
𝐵  The oracle operation to encode Bob’s query result Dq 
Os The oracle operation which conditionally changes the 
sign in the amplitudes of the query item Dp (Dq) 
Op The oracle operation which perform a conditional 
phase shift of -1 with every computational bass state 
except |0⟩ 
3.1 Some definitions 
In order to clearly illustrate our scheme, we first define 
the problem to be solved. 
Definition 1 (Database query problem for privacy 
preservation in cloud environment): In the cloud 
environment, the cloud server has a collection of 
sensitive data 𝐷 = {𝐷0, 𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑁−1}, and each client 
wants to query a data item 𝐷𝑖  (0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 1) from the 
cloud server without revealing which item is queried. 
During the retrieving process, the client cannot gain any 
other data item except 𝐷𝑖 . 
Definition 2 (Database query scheme for privacy 
preservation in cloud environment): Each client inputs 
the index of query item i (0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 1), and cloud 
server inputs sensitive dataset 𝐷 = {𝐷0, 𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑁−1} . 
After executing this scheme, the client outputs the 
queried data item Di. In addition, the scheme should 
satisfy: 
 Correctness: The client successfully obtains the 
correct data item he(she) wants to query (i.e., Di). 
 Clients’ privacy: During the retrieving process, 
the cloud server cannot get any private 
information about the query index of the client. 
 Cloud server’s privacy: Clients cannot get any 
other data items from the cloud server except Di. 
3.2 A quantum-based database query scheme for 
privacy preservation in cloud environment 
For the sake of simplicity, we take three parties (one 
cloud server Charlie, and two clients Alice, Bob) as an 
example to describe our scheme. Suppose Charile has a 
private database D with N items {𝐷0, 𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑁−1} and 
an encryption key sequence 𝐾 = {𝐾0, 𝐾1, … , 𝐾𝑁−1}, and 
Alice and Bob want to respectively query an item, the 
p-th item Dp and the q-th item 𝐷𝑞  (0 ≤ 𝑝, 𝑞 ≤ 𝑁 − 1), 
from server. The scheme consists of five steps as follows 
(also shown in Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2. The five-step procedures of the QBDQ scheme among two clients and cloud server. The thick (thin) line represents quantum (classic) channel.
Step 1: Charlie prepares an (n+m)-qubit state |𝜙𝐾⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ |𝑖⟩⨂|0⟩⊗𝑚𝑁−1𝑖=0 , where 𝑛 = ⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁⌉ , 𝑚 =
⌈log (max{𝑘𝑖|0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 1} + 1)⌉. And then he applies 
an oracle operation 𝑂𝐾  (its schematic circuit is sketched 
in Fig. 3) on |𝜙𝐾⟩  referring to the sequence 𝐾 =
{𝐾0, 𝐾1, … , 𝐾𝑁−1}. Here, 𝑂𝐾  is defined as follows, 
1 1
0 0
1 1
: 0
N N
m
K i
i i
O i i K
N N
 

 
    ,  (9) 
where |𝑖⟩ denotes the index of the data item, and |𝐾𝑖⟩ 
is the encryption key originally assigned to encrypt the 
i-th data item. After the above operation, we can get the 
state namely |𝜙′⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ |𝑖⟩⨂|𝐾𝑖⟩
𝑁−1
𝑖=0 , and then Charlie 
sends it to Alice with oblivious transfer strategy. Similar 
to Alice, Charlie also prepares another state |𝜓′⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ |𝑖⟩⨂|𝐾𝑖⟩
𝑁−1
𝑖=0  in the same way and sends it to Bob. 
oracle
 
Fig. 3. Schematic circuit of the oracle operation 𝑂𝐾 . 
Step 2: After receiving |𝜙′⟩ from Charlie, Alice takes 
{|0⟩, |1⟩, … , |𝑁 − 1⟩}  as the computational basis, and 
performs projective measurement on the index qubits of 
|𝜙′⟩ . Suppose the measurement result is 𝜆𝐴 (𝜆𝐴 ∈
{0,1, … , 𝑁 − 1}), the remaining m qubits will collapse 
into |𝐾𝜆𝐴⟩, which means Alice can obtain 𝐾𝜆𝐴 (i.e., one 
of the encryption keys) through projective measurement. 
Since Alice’s retrieving index is p, she computes the 
offset ∆𝑠𝑨 = (𝜆𝐴 − 𝑝), and sends it to Charlie. As same 
as Alice, Bob also performs the same operations and 
announces the offset ∆𝑠𝑩 = (𝜆𝐵 − 𝑞) to Charlie, where 
𝜆𝐵 is the measurement result, and q represents the index 
of the data item Bob wants to query. 
Step 3: Having received the offsets ∆𝑠𝐴  and ∆𝑠𝐵 , 
Charlie updates every encryption key as follows, 
( )mod
( )mod
A
B
A
i i s N
B
i i s N
K K
K K




,             (10) 
and obtains the new key sequence 𝐾𝐴 and 𝐾𝐵,  
{ | 0 1}
{ | 0 1}
A A
i
B B
i
K K i N
K K i N
   
   
.         (11) 
Then, Charlie encrypts every data items respectively 
with its new corresponding keys 𝐾𝑖
𝐴 and 𝐾𝑖
𝐵 as below, 
,0 1
,0 1
A A
i i i
B B
i i i
D D K i N
D D K i N
    
    
.       (12) 
After that, Charlie prepares two states |𝜙𝐷⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ |𝑖⟩⨂|0⟩⨂𝑚𝑁−1𝑖=0 , |𝜓𝐷⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ |𝑖⟩⨂|0⟩⨂𝑚𝑁−1𝑖=0 , and 
applies the oracle operation 𝑂𝐷
𝐴, 𝑂𝐷
𝐵 as below,  
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 0
1 1
: 0
1 1
: 0
N N
mA A
D i
i i
N N
mB B
D i
i i
O i i D
N N
O i i D
N N
 

 
 

 


 
 
,    (13) 
and gets the final states |𝜙′′⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ |𝑖⟩|𝐷𝑖
𝐴⟩𝑁−1𝑖=0 , 
|𝜓′′⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ |𝑖⟩|𝐷𝑖
𝐵⟩𝑁−1𝑖=0 . Finally, Charlie sends |𝜙′′⟩ , 
|𝜓′′⟩  to Alice and Bob, respectively with oblivious 
transfer strategy. 
Step 4: After receiving |𝜙′′⟩  from Charlie, Alice 
performs the modified Grover iteration on it to obtain the 
target state |𝑝⟩|𝐷𝑝
𝐴⟩ . Fig. 4 describes the detailed 
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process of modified Grover iteration, which consists of at 
most ⌈
π
4
√2𝑛+𝑚⌉  times application of a quantum 
subroutine, called the 𝐺 operator. The whole process of 
𝐺 operator (also shown in Fig. 5) can be subdivided into 
four steps as follows.  
n+m
oracle 
qubits
Fig. 4. Schematic circuit of the modified Grover iteration applied on 
state |𝜙′′⟩, where G is the quantum subroutine illustrated in Fig. 5. 
n+m
phase transfer:
oracle
oracle 
qubits  
Fig. 5 Schematic circuit of the G operator. 
Step 4-1: Alice applies the oracle operation 𝑂𝑠 on |𝜙′′⟩, 
which conditionally changes the sign of the amplitudes 
of the query item 
1 1
( )
0 0
1 1
: ( 1)
N N
A f i A
s i i
i i
O i D i D
N N
 
 
     (14) 
Here, we call the resultant state 𝑂𝑠|𝜙′′⟩, i.e., 𝑂𝑠|𝜙′′⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ (−1)𝑓(𝑖)|𝑖⟩|𝐷𝑖
𝐴⟩𝑁−1𝑖=0 , and 𝑓(𝑖)  is the judgement 
function defined by: 
1, ( . ., )
( )
0, ( . ., )
if i is the query address i e i p
f i
else i e i p

 

(15) 
Step 4-2: The Hadamard transformation 𝐻⨂(𝑛+𝑚)  is 
applied on 𝑂𝑠|𝜙′′⟩, 
1
( )
0
1
( ) ( )
0
1
( 1)
1
( 1)
N
f i A
i
i
N
n m f i A
i
i
i D
N
H i D
N



 


 


.     (16) 
Step 4-3: Alice applies conditionally phase transfer Op 
on the state 𝐻⨂(𝑛+𝑚)𝑂𝑠|𝜙′′⟩, 
,
1
( ) ( )
0
1
( ) ( )
0
1
: ( 1)
1
( 1) ( 1)i Di
N
n m f i A
p i
i
N
n m f i A
i
i
O H i D
N
H i D
N


 


 


   


,  (17) 
where the function 𝜎𝑖,𝐷𝑖 is defined as follows,  
,
1, 0, 0,
0, .i
i
i D
i D
else

 
 

            (18) 
Step 4-4: The Hadamard transformation 𝐻⨂(𝑛+𝑚)  is 
applied again on 𝑂𝑝𝐻
⨂(𝑛+𝑚)𝑂𝑠|𝜙′′⟩ , and obtains the 
state 
1
( ) ( )
0
1 Nn m n m A
P s i
i
H O H O i D
N


   

    (19) 
Alice applies the above Grover iteration ⌈
π
4
√2𝑛+𝑚⌉ 
times, and finally obtains the target state |𝑝⟩|𝐷𝑝
𝐴⟩.  
Similar to Alice, Bob also applies the modified Grover 
iteration on the received state |𝜓′′⟩ =
1
√N
∑ |𝑖⟩|𝐷𝑖
𝐴⟩𝑁−1𝑖=0 , 
and obtains the target query state |𝑞⟩|𝐷𝑞
𝐵⟩. 
Step 5: Alice and Bob measure the last m-qubit of state 
|𝑝⟩|𝐷𝑝
𝐴⟩, |𝑞⟩|𝐷𝑞
𝐵⟩, and extract the classic information of 
query result 𝐷𝑝
𝐴, 𝐷𝑞
𝐵 , respectively. 
In addition, in order to check eavesdropping in the 
quantum channel, we can use decoy-photon 
technology. That is, the sender randomly inserts 
several decoy photons into the qubit sequence, where 
every decoy photon is prepared randomly with either 
Z-basis {|0⟩, |1⟩} or X-basis  {
1
√2
(|0⟩ + |1⟩),
1
√2
(|0⟩ −
|1⟩)} , and transmits them to the receiver. After 
confirming that the receiver has received the transmitted 
sequence, the sender announces the positions of the 
decoy photons and the corresponding measurement basis. 
The receiver measures the decoy photons according to 
the sender’s announcements, and tells the sender his (her) 
measurement results. Then, the sender compares the 
measurement results from the receiver with the initial 
states of the decoy photons in the transmitted sequence, 
and calculates the error rate. If the error rate is higher 
than the threshold which determined by the channel 
noise, they cancel this scheme and restart; else they 
continue the next step. 
It is worth mentioning that, we adopted the OT 
strategy and offset encryption mechanism in our scheme. 
In step 3, the OT strategy is utilized to transfer Charlie's 
data to Alice and Bob. As we know, the transmitted state 
|𝜓⟩ is a superposition state which encapsulates all the 
encrypted data items {𝐷𝑖|0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 1} . So, the 
process of Charlie sending |𝜙′⟩, |𝜓′⟩ to Alice and Bob 
can be viewed as the oblivious transfer mechanism. The 
use of OT strategy ensures that information about 
Charlie cannot be leaked. In addition, our scheme also 
applied the offset encryption mechanism. The offsets 
∆s𝐴, ∆s𝐵 can be computed by using the index of the 
query data items and the keys determined by clients’ 
measurement. Charlie updates the encryption keys 
according to these offsets, and then encrypts data with 
these updated keys, respectively. The combination of OT 
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strategy and offset mechanism allows Alice and Bob 
obtain the correct data they want to query, while Charlie 
cannot get their queried data, which guaranteed the 
privacy of client. At the same time, data encryption 
makes the data items into ciphertext, and neither the 
eavesdropper nor the clients can directly obtain the data 
item, thus ensuring the data security of the cloud server. 
4. Performance evaluation 
Our proposed QBDQ scheme in cloud environment tends 
to ensure the correctness of query result, protect the 
privacy of clients and servers in cloud, and also improve 
the efficiency during querying the cloud database. 
Therefore, we take three parties (i.e., clients Alice and 
Bob, cloud server Charlie) as an example, and estimate 
the overall performance of the proposed scheme in terms 
of correctness analysis, security analysis, and the 
efficiency analysis.  
4.1 Correctness analysis 
Now, we analyze the correctness of the proposed scheme. 
Without loss of generality, suppose that the server 
Charlie has a database of 16 items 
𝐷 = {5,9,6,12,2,11,11,6,5,10,7,15,6,11,6,9} , and he 
holds the corresponding encryption key sequence 
𝐾 = {14,8,3,4,7,1,11,6,15,2,12,13,0,5,9,10} . Since 
𝑁 =16, the max value in 𝐾  is 15, 𝑛 = ⌈log𝑁⌉ =
⌈log16⌉ = 4 , 𝑚 = ⌈log (15 + 1)⌉ = 4 . Here, we take 
Alice as an example to analyze the procedures of our 
QBDQ scheme as below (suppose Alice want to query 
the 9
th
 item of the database). 
In step 1, Charlie prepares an initial state 
|𝜙𝐾⟩ =
1
4
∑ |𝑖⟩⨂|0000⟩15𝑖=0  and performs an oracle 
operation 𝑂𝐾  on it to encode his encryption keys, 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 10 11
1
( 0 1 2 3 4 5
4
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 )
1
( 0 14 1 8 2 3 3 4 4 7 5 1 6 11
4
7 6 8 15 9 2 10 12 11 13 12 0
13 5 14 9 15 10 )
K K K K K K
K K K K K K
K K K K
      
     
   
      
     
  
 
(20) 
Then, he sends the resultant state |𝜙′⟩ to Alice. In step 2, 
Alice performs projective measurement on the first four 
qubits (i.e., index qubits) of |𝜙′⟩ in the computational 
basis {|0000⟩ , |0001⟩ ,…, |1111⟩}. Suppose the random 
measurement result is |12⟩ (i.e., λ𝐴  = 12), then the 
remaining qubits (i.e., the key qubits) collapse to the 
state |𝐾λ𝐴⟩ = |0000⟩, which means 𝐾λ𝐴 = 0000. But the 
data Alice wants to query is the ninth data D8, so she 
computes the difference between 𝜆𝐴 and the desirable 
query index q , ∆s = (𝜆𝐴 − q) = 4 , and sends ∆s  to 
Charlie. After receiving ∆s , Charlie updates the key 
sequence K through the formulation 𝐾𝑖
𝐴 = 𝐾(𝑖+∆𝑠)𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑁, 
then 𝐾𝑖
𝐴 = {7,1,11,6,15,2,12,13,0,5,9,10,14,8,3,4} . He 
uses 𝐾𝑖
𝐴 to encrypt every data items: 𝐷𝑖
𝐴 = 𝐷𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖
𝐴, 
that is, {2,8,13,10,13,9,7,11,5,15,14,5,8,3,5,13}. Then, 
in step 3, Charlie prepares another state |𝜙𝐷⟩ =
 
1
4
∑ |𝑖⟩⨂ |0000⟩15𝑖=0  and applies the oracle operation 𝑂𝐷
𝐴 
to embed the encrypted data items 𝐷𝑖
𝐴, 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15
1
( 0 1 2 3 4 5
4
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 )
1
( 0 2 1 8 2 13 3 10 4 13
4
5 9 6 7 7 11 8 5 9 15
10 14 11 5 12 8 13 3
14 5 15 13 )
D D D D D D
D D D D D D
D D D D
      
     
   
    
    
   
 
. 
(21) 
Then, he sends the state |𝜙′′⟩ to Alice.  
  Further, Alice performs modified Grover iteration on 
|𝜙′′⟩  up to 𝑅 =  ⌈
π
4
√2𝑛+𝑚⌉ = ⌈
π
4
√28⌉ = 13 times 
(actually, the number of iterations is 6), then she can 
obtain the encrypted query item |𝑝⟩|𝐷𝑝
𝐴⟩ = |8⟩|5⟩ with 
high possibility, and measures it to get 𝐷𝑝
𝐴 = 5. Alice 
uses the obtained key 𝐾8
𝐴 = 0 to decrypt the ninth item 
 
8 8 8 0101 0000 0101
A AD D K     .       (22) 
Therefore, regardless of what measurement result Alice 
has obtained, she can finally obtain the query data 
correctly.  
Fig. 6 shows the entire execution process of Alice 
querying Charlie’s database in a simplified way. At the 
same time, it also sketched the execution of the other 
user Bob (assuming it queries the fifth data). 
4.2 Security analysis 
(1) Privacy analysis 
Cloud Server's privacy. Suppose the client Alice is 
dishonest, and she wants to obtain more information 
about Charlie’s database. In step 1 of our scheme, the 
server Charlie sends the quantum state 
|𝜙′⟩ =
1
√𝑁
∑ |𝑖⟩|𝐾𝑖⟩
𝑁−1
𝑖=0  to client Alice through oblivious 
transfer strategy. Since all the information about the key 
sequence 𝐾 is encoded in the state |𝜙′⟩, so Alice cannot 
extract the key form |𝜙′⟩ directly. Here we suppose the 
whole system of quantum state |𝜙′⟩ consisted of two 
subsystems, i.e., the n-qubit quantum subsystem C (index 
qubits |𝑖⟩) and the m-qubit subsystem D (key qubits 
|𝐾𝑖⟩). If Alice makes a projective measurement on the 
received state |𝜙′⟩ , she will get the resultant state 
|𝑖⟩|𝐾𝑖⟩ for any 𝑖 with the probability of 
1
𝑁
. The whole 
system can be represented by the quantum ensemble 
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𝜀 = {𝑝𝑖 , 𝜌(𝑖)}, here 𝑝𝑖 =
1
𝑁
,  
( ) i ii i K K i  .          (23) 
Here we get the upper limit of information that Alice can 
get from Charlie’s is determined by the Holevo bound 
[38], 
1
0
1
( ) () (( ): )
N
i
S SH B i
N
A  


           (24) 
Here 𝑆(𝜌) denotes Von Neumann entropy of quantum 
state 𝜌, H(B:A) means the information Alice can get 
about Charlie’s key information (including the address 𝑖 
and according keys 𝐾𝑖), we have 
1
0
1
( ) ( ) .i
N
i
iS S i i nK K m
N



        (25) 
and 𝑆(𝜌(𝑖)) = 𝑆(|𝑖⟩|𝐾𝑖⟩⟨𝐾𝑖|⟨𝑖|) = 0, therefore, 
( : ) .H A B n m                (26) 
Then, Alice can only get 𝑛-bit of address information 
(i.e., 𝑖)
 
and the corresponding 𝑚-bit key(i.e., 𝐾𝑖 ) by 
measuring 𝜌. In addition, she will certainly lose the 
change to get her key 𝐾𝑖 . This means Alice cannot 
extract more than one key from Charlie. 
Besides, in step 3, Charlie uses the offset key 
𝐾𝑖
𝐴 = 𝐾𝑖+△𝑠  to encrypt the data items, and send its 
encoded state |𝜙′′⟩ =
1
√Δ𝑠
∑ |𝑖⟩|𝐷𝑖
𝐴⟩𝑁−1𝑖=0  to Alice with 
oblivious transfer strategy. Alice’s privacy of query index 
i is protected by the oblivious transfer strategy. For 
example, the transmitted state |𝜙′′⟩ Alice received is a 
superposition state, i.e., |𝜙′′⟩ =
1
√𝑁
(|0⟩|𝐷0⟩ +
|1⟩|𝐷1⟩ + ⋯ + |𝑁 − 1⟩|𝐷𝑁−1⟩),  which encapsulates all 
the query data {𝐷𝑝
𝐴|0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑁 − 1}  including the 
desirable one 𝐷𝑝
𝐴 . Alice obtains the query item 𝐷𝑝
𝐴 
through the Grover iteration and the previously obtained 
key 𝐾λ𝐴. Suppose Bob is also dishonest, he has the same 
situation with Alice. 
 
Fig. 6 The schematic graph of the execution process of Alice and Bob in our QBDQ scheme, assuring they query the 9-th and 5-th items, respectively.
Client's privacy. If Charlie is dishonest, he may try to obtain Alice’s private query index p during the 
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communication process. However, Alice only sends one 
classic message ∆𝑠 = 𝜆𝐴 − 𝑝 to cloud server Charlie in 
Step 2, and Charlie does not know the encryption key 
which chosen by Alice, thus he cannot obtain any useful 
information about the data Alice wants to search. As 
same as Alice, Bob only sends a classic offset message 
∆𝑠 = 𝜆𝐵 − 𝑝 to Charlie, which prevents Charlie from 
obtaining his information. 
(2) Channel security analysis 
The security of the quantum channel is guaranteed by 
the decoy-photon checking technology. The process of 
eavesdropping detect done by the two neighbor 
participants in our scheme is essentially equivalent to 
that in the BB84 scheme [36], which has been proved to 
be unconditionally secure. To be specific, the decoy 
qubits, which are randomly inserted into target qubits, 
are generated by randomly chosen from 
{|0⟩,|1⟩, |+⟩,|−⟩}. After one participant sends the mixed 
decoy qubits and encrypted target qubits to quantum 
center, he will ask quantum center to measure them with 
the same bases these qubits were produced. For any 
outside eavesdropper, the bases used by participants are 
all random, the eavesdropper cannot produce the same 
qubits like decoy qubits before quantum center receives 
the qubits. Just like the situation in the BB84 scheme, if 
any outside eavesdropper exists in the process of our 
scheme, the eavesdropping actions will be found by the 
two participants.  
The outside eavesdropper cannot get the shared key 
because eavesdropper cannot distinguish target qubits 
form decoy qubits, and he can only choose one set of 
orthogonal basis to measure it, so the eavesdropper will 
certainly change the states of the qubit, and then he will 
be discovered. We assume that eavesdropper will do 
intercept-resend attack. Eavesdropper applies operation 
𝑈𝐸 and auxiliary system |𝐸⟩  which satisfies the 
following conditions, 
00 010 0 1EU E a E b E  ,          (27) 
01 111 0 1EU E c E d E  .          (28) 
Here, |𝑎|2 + |𝑏|2 = 1  and |𝑐|2 + |𝑑|2 = 1 . If the 
eavesdropper wants to extract the encode information 
precisely, then 𝑈𝐸 
must satisfy 
 
  
00 01 10 11
00 01 10 11
1
0 1 0 1
2
1
+
2
EU E a E b E c E d E
a E b E c E d E
    
   
, (29) 
 
  
00 01 10 11
00 01 10 11
1
0 1 0 1
2
1
2
EU E a E b E c E d E
a E b E c E d E
    
    
,
  
(30)
 
  
00 01 10 11
00 01 10 11
1
0 1 0 1
2
1
2
EU y E a E b E ic E id E
y a E ib E ic E d E
    
    
,
 
(31) 
 
  
00 01 10 11
00 01 10 11
1
0 1 0 1
2
1
2
EU y E a E b E ic E id E
y a E ib E ic E d E
    
    
. (32) 
From Eq. (29)-(32) we can obtain that 
00 01 10 11 0a E b E c E d E    ,      (33) 
00 01 10 11 0a E b E c E d E    ,      (34) 
00 01 10 11 0a E ib E ic E d E    ,      (35) 
00 01 10 11 0a E ib E ic E d E    ,      (36) 
we can get that a = d = 1 , b = c = 0  and  
|𝐸00⟩ = |𝐸11⟩, then we get 
000 0EU E E ,             (37) 
111 1EU E E ,              (38) 
we can summarize that eavesdropper would not be 
found only when decoy qubits and target qubits are 
{|0⟩, |1⟩}, which is impossible. So there is no way for 
the eavesdropper to know the secret key. 
4.3 Efficiency analysis 
As we know, Quantum-based schemes have greater 
information capacity than classic ones. In order to 
evaluate the efficiency of our QDBQ scheme more 
objectively, We choose some of the most representative 
quantum schemes as comparison objects, for example, 
Jakobi et al.’s quantum private query (QPQ) scheme (J11 
for short) [44], Gao et al.'s QPQ scheme (G12) [45], and 
Rao et al.'s QPQ) scheme (R13) [46].  
To evaluate the efficiency of quantum communication 
schemes, there are mainly two indicators:  the 
communication complexity (i.e., the number of 
transmitted qubits), and the consumption of exchanged 
classic messages (i.e., the number of exchanged classic 
bits). 
(1) Communication complexity 
The communication complexity, i.e., the number of 
quantum bits (qubits) transmitted in the communication 
process, is one of the key indicators of the efficiency for 
communication scheme. In J11 and G12 schemes, the 
cloud server (Charlie) sends 𝑘 × 𝑁 qubits to the client 
(Alice), where 𝑘 is the number of divided substrings. 
These 𝑘 substrings are added bitwise in order to reduce 
Alice’s information on the key to roughly one bit (i.e., 
?̅? = 𝑁(
1
4
)𝑘 ≈ 1 ), so 𝑘 = log√𝑁 . In summary, 
𝑁 × log√𝑁  qubits are transmitted in J11 and J12 
schemes, and its communication complexity is 
𝑂(𝑁log𝑁). But in the R13 scheme, the number of qubits 
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that need to be exchanged is reduced to 𝑂(𝑁), so the 
communication complexity is 𝑂(𝑁). 
In our QBDQ scheme, Charlie firstly transmits a 
(⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁⌉ + 𝑚 )-qubit state |𝜙′⟩ (|𝜓′⟩) for sending the 
encryption keys in step 1, and the (⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁⌉ + 𝑚)-qubit 
state  |𝜙′′⟩  ( |𝜓′′⟩ ) containing every encrypted data 
𝐷𝑖(0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 1) is transmitted to Alice(Bob) in step 
3. Considering that each data item the cloud server holds 
is an only one-bit message in J11, G12 and R13 schemes, 
here we let 𝑚=1. Therefore, the transmitted qubits are 
2(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁 + 1) , so its communication complexity is 
𝑂(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁). 
To be more intuitive, we calculate the numbers of 
transmitted qubits in different database capacities for the 
J11, G12, R13, and our QBDQ schemes (see Table 2), 
and show the comparison results among them in Fig. 7. 
As shown in this figure, J11 and G12 schemes have the 
same qubits consumption, R13 scheme reduces the 
consumption, and our QBDQ scheme has the lowest 
qubits consumption. That is, our scheme has the lowest 
communication complexity among them. 
Table. 2: Numbers of transmitted qubits in different database capacities 
for J11, G12, R13 and our QBDQ schemes. 
Database 
size 
Transmitted 
messages(qubit) Database 
size 
Transmitted 
messages(qubit) 
J11/ G12 R13 QBDQ J11/G12  R13 QBDQ 
8 24 8 3 208 1664 208 8 
16 64 16 4 216 1728 216 8 
24 120 24 5 224 1792 224 8 
32 160 32 5 232 1856 232 8 
40 240 40 6 240 1920 240 8 
48 288 48 6 248 1984 248 8 
56 336 56 6 256 2048 256 8 
64 384 64 6 264 2376 264 9 
72 504 72 7 272 2448 272 9 
80 560 80 7 280 2520 280 9 
88 616 88 7 288 2592 288 9 
96 672 96 7 296 2664 296 9 
104 728 104 7 304 2736 304 9 
112 784 112 7 312 2808 312 9 
120 840 120 7 320 2880 320 9 
128 896 128 7 328 2952 328 9 
136 1088 136 8 336 3024 336 9 
144 1152 144 8 344 3096 344 9 
152 1216 152 8 352 3168 352 9 
160 1280 160 8 360 3240 360 9 
168 1344 168 8 368 3312 368 9 
176 1408 176 8 376 3384 376 9 
184 1472 184 8 384 3456 384 9 
192 1536 192 8 392 3528 392 9 
200 1600 200 8 400 3600 400 9 
 
 
Fig. 7: Comparison of transmitted qubits among our QBDQ scheme, 
J11, G12, R13 schemes. 
(2) Consumption of exchanged classic messages 
For a communication scheme, it should also consider 
the consumption of the exchanged classic messages. In 
the J11, J12 and R13 schemes, 𝑁 × 1 bits of encrypted 
data, considering each data item is a one-bit message (i.e., 
𝑚 = 1), are transmitted from the cloud server to the 
client, so their exchanged classic messages are all 𝑂(𝑁) 
cbits. In our scheme, Alice (Bob) returns a classical 
message Δ𝑠, i.e., a (⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁⌉ × 𝑚)-cbit classic message, 
to Charlie in step 2. Since 𝑚 = 1 , the exchanged 
message is just 𝑂(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁) cbits.  
Table 3 lists the numbers of transmitted qubits in 
different database capacities for the J11, G12, R13, and 
our QBDQ schemes, while Fig. 8 gives a more intuitive 
comparison between our QBDQ scheme and the other 
QPQ schemes (J11, G12, R13 schemes). Obviously, our 
scheme needs less consumption of exchanged classic 
messages than other QPQ protocols. 
Table. 3: Exchanged classic messages in different database capacities 
for J11, G12, R13 and our QBDQ schemes. 
Database 
size 
Exchanged messages Database 
size 
Exchanged messages 
J11/G12/R13  QBDQ J11/G12/R13  QBDQ 
8 8 3 88 88 7 
16 16 4 96 96 7 
24 24 5 104 104 7 
32 32 5 112 112 7 
40 40 6 120 120 7 
48 48 6 128 128 7 
56 56 6 136 136 8 
64 64 6 144 144 8 
72 72 7 152 152 8 
80 80 7 160 160 8 
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 Fig. 8: Comparison of exchanged classic bits between our QBDQ 
scheme and the other QPQ schemes (J11, G12, R13 schemes). 
In summary, Table 4 lists the comparison among our 
QBDQ scheme and the other three QPQ schemes clearly. 
As shown in Table 4, our scheme achieves a great 
reduction on both the communication complexity and the 
consumption of exchanged classic messages. Besides, 
our QBDQ scheme just needs to perform quantum 
measurement two times, which is obviously less than the 
other ones. 
Table 4. Comparison among our QBDQ scheme and the other QPQ 
schemes 
Schemes 
Communication 
complexity 
(qubit) 
Exchanged 
message 
(bit) 
Measurement 
times 
J11 
G12 
R13 
Ours 
O(NlogN) 
O(NlogN) 
O(N) 
O(logN) 
N+1 
N+1 
N+1 
1
 
kN 
kN 
N 
2 
 
5. Related Work 
Cloud database services are typically run on cloud 
computing platforms, and access to cloud databases is 
provided as a service, which takes care of scalability and 
availability of the database, and it makes the underlying 
software-stack transparent to the user. 
Benefit from cloud computing technologies and 
devices, more and more data owners are motivated to 
outsource their data to cloud servers for great 
convenience in data management, and cloud database 
query has attracted the attention of scholars. Cloud 
database query was firstly proposed by Chor et al. [40], 
where the privacy of the server cannot be guaranteed, 
which means that sensitive data (e.g., health records, 
financial transactions) stored in cloud database is 
threatened by information leaks. Therefore, how to 
preserve the privacy of sensitive data in the process of 
cloud database query has become an important topic. In 
order to solve the problem, many methods are proposed 
to guarantee the privacy preservation of database query 
[12-18], one of the most popular methods is SE. 
SE is a special kind of private query, which enables 
the user to store the encrypted data to the cloud and 
execute keyword search over ciphertext. Since Song et 
al.[15] proposed the first practical private database query 
scheme for searching on encrypted data in cloud and 
provided the security proofs for the scheme, some other 
schemes to address privacy protection issues in cloud 
database queries have also been proposed[17, 18]. In 
order to support more complex queries, the conjunctive 
keyword search scheme [14] over encrypted data has 
been proposed. After that, a more general approach, 
predicate encryption [16], which supports inner-product,  
was also proposed. 
In general, most of the above schemes [12-18, 40] are 
based on public key cryptography such as RSA, and its 
security is based on mathematical NP-hard problems. 
Therefore, these schemes are difficult to crack in 
polynomial time for a classic computers. all of the above 
protocols is based on public key cryptography such as 
RSA. On a quantum computer, to factor an integer 𝑁, 
Shor's algorithm [19] can run in polynomial time (the 
time taken is polynomial in 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁, which is the size of 
the input. Specifically, it takes quantum gates of 
order O((𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁)2(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁)(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁)) using fast 
multiplication,[41] thus demonstrating that the 
integer-factorization problem (The large factorization 
problem is the security foundation of RSA) can be 
efficiently solved on a quantum computer and is 
consequently in the complexity class BQP. This is almost 
exponentially faster than the most efficient known 
classical factoring algorithm, so we can say that these 
schemes [12-18, 40] are not resistant to quantum attacks. 
Different from classic schemes based on mathematical 
complexity, the security of quantum based schemes is  
guaranteed by some properties of quantum mechanics, 
such as non-cloning theorem, uncertainty principle. They 
are considered to have potential unconditional security, 
and of course also include resistance to quantum attacks.  
Recently, some researchers have tried to utilize 
quantum mechanics to design private query schemes. In 
2008, Giovannetti et al. [42] proposed the first quantum 
private query (QPQ) protocol. The client sends the query 
|𝑗⟩𝑄 and a decoy state (|𝑗⟩𝑄 + |0⟩𝑄)/√2 to the server 
in random order, then Bob uses each of them to 
interrogate his database using a qRAM (which records 
the reply to her queries in a register R), and returns 
|𝑗⟩𝑄|𝐴𝑗⟩𝑅 or (|𝑗
⟩𝑄|𝐴𝑗⟩𝑅 + |0
⟩𝑄|0⟩𝑅) /√2. The returned 
decoy state is used to check the eavesdropping of the 
server or the outside party. In 2011, Olejnik [43] 
presented a new QPQ protocol in a similar form with 
Giovannetti et al.'s protocol. By subtly selecting the 
oracle operation and the encoding scheme, one query 
state can achieve two aims simultaneously, i.e., obtaining 
the expected information and checking Bob's potential 
attack, so the communication complexity is reduced. 
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Unfortunately, it is very vulnerable to the realities of 
significant transmission losses.  
Therefore, Jakobi et al. [44] proposed a novel QPQ 
protocol (J11) based on the QKD protocol, where QKD 
is essentially a quantum analog of SE. In this protocol, 
an asymmetric key can be distributed between Alice and 
Bob by utilizing SARG04 QKD protocol, and Bob 
encrypts the whole database with the QKD key. Alice 
only knows few bits of the key, which ensures the 
database privacy. Compared with the previous QPQ 
protocols, J11 protocol is loss-tolerant and more secure. 
What’s more, the J11 protocol can be easily generalized 
to the large database. Later, Gao et al. [45] proposed a 
flexible generalized protocol (G12) based on the J11 
protocol, which introduced a variable 𝜃 to adjust the 
balance between database security and client privacy. 
Considering a database with size N, the J11 and G12 
protocols have a communication complexity of O(Nlog 
N). In order to reduce the complexity, Rao et al. [46] 
gave two more efficient protocols (R13), which reduced 
the number of exchanged qubits to O(N). 
Different from classical encryption schemes based on 
some mathematical difficult problems, these findings 
have shown the potential in either the improvements of 
efficiency or the enhancements of security in cloud 
computing field with large computing resources and also 
brought new quantum technologies to solve private 
database query problems. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are few studies focusing on the 
quantum-based privacy-preserving database query 
problem in cloud environment. Therefore, we combine 
quantum mechanics with cloud database queries and 
proposed a QBDQ which aims to realize the privacy 
preservation for the clients and cloud server. 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
As far as we know, the existing QPQ schemes either 
belong to the qRAM-based schemes, such as, 
Giovannetti et al.’s [42] and Olejnik’s [43] schemes, or 
belong to the QKD-based schemes, such as, Jakobi et 
al.’s [44], Gao et al.’s [45] and Rao et al.’ s [46] schemes. 
These QKD-based schemes solve the problem of the 
server’s privacy, their communication complexity needs 
to be further reduced. In this study, we propose an 
efficient quantum private query scheme based on oracle 
operation, modified Grover iteration, oblivious transfer 
strategy and the special offset encryption mechanism 
rather than QKD or qRAM. Compared with those 
schemes, our QBDQ scheme shows higher efficiency in 
terms of the communication complexity, the 
consumption of exchanged message, and the quantum 
measurement. 
In our QBDQ scheme, we adopt the oblivious transfer 
strategy to solve the problem of the client’s privacy, i.e., 
the client will ask the server to transmit all these 
encrypted data items to him/her. But in a real-world 
cloud environment, this is not a good approach. Although 
it guarantees that there is no information about the query 
index to be leaked, but it needs to transmit too many data 
items from the cloud database. Even if quantum 
resources have an exponential high-capacity advantage, 
it is also a waste of resources. Maybe the “query window” 
strategy is a better choice. To be specific, the client can 
firstly choose an index window that contains the 
desirable query item, and ask the server transmit these 
encrypted data items in this window scope other than the 
all data items, to him/her in a quantum way. Although 
there is certain information leakage from the perspective 
of information theory, it can save quantum resources. In 
this strategy, the selection of the size of a query window 
is a key point. In order to achieve a balance of efficiency 
and security, perhaps some game theory (such as, Nash 
Equilibrium [47, 48]) and penalty functions[49-51] can 
provide relevant optimized solutions.  
It's worth noting that although the proposed solution 
involves two clients, for the sake of brevity (and for 
comparison with other quantum schemes), Alice and Bob 
do not interact. This is the most common pattern in cloud 
database queries. For the multi-party joint inquiry 
method, we will discuss it in future work. In addition, we 
just consider the ideal framework of the 
privacy-preserving database query in cloud environment, 
i.e., all the clients and cloud server are semi-honest. But 
in a real cloud environment, clients and servers may be 
untrustworthy. How to generalize our QBDQ into such 
multi-user and the untrusted scenario is an interesting 
work.  
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